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COMMENTS
THE KNOWLEDGE ELEMENT OF ASSUMPTION OF
RISK AS A DEFENSE TO STRICT
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
INTRODUCTION

Prosser dubbed knowledge as the "watchword" of the traditional assumption of risk defense.' The related affirmative
defense in products liability, for which this author has arbitrarily
chosen the name of assumption of risk, is really an amalgam of
the traditional concepts of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. 2 The Restatement view 3 of the defense, which is
now accepted by a majority of the courts, 4 is based on the negli1, W. PROSsFa, THE LAW OF TORTS 447 (4th ed. 1971).

2. Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Pa. 324, 327, 223 A.2d 746, 748
(1966) (using both names); Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516,
521 (Tenn. 1973) (using both names and stating that it makes no difference which one is used); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n (1965) (using both names to define the defense); Prosser, Strict
Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HAsTNcs L.J. 9, 48-50 (1966);
Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-Restructuring Assumption of Risk
in the Products Liability Era, 60 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Twerski]; Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw.
L.J. 5, 21-22 (1965); see Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV.
791, 838-39 (1966).
3. The Restatement gives the following definition of the defense:
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such
negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the
product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the
other hand the form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger,
and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense . . . . If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is
aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to
make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A, comment n (1965) (emphasis
added). The traditional defense of assumption of risk had only two elements-subjective knowledge and voluntary encounter. Comment n
adds the third additional element of unreasonable encounter. Johnson
v. Clark Equip. Co., 274 Or. 403,-, 547 P.2d 132, 138 (1976).
4. E.g., Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 329-30 (Alas. 1970); O.S.
Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 561, 447 P.2d 248, 253 (1968); Luque
v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 145-46, 501 P.2d 1163, 1170, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443,
450 (1972); Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983, 988 (Colo.
1975); Shields v. Morton Chem. Co., 95 Idaho 674, 677, 518 P.2d 857, 860
(1974); Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 426, 261 N.E.2d 305,
309-10 (1970); Gregory v. White Truck & Equip. Co., 323 N.E.2d 280, 290
(Ind. 1975); Hawkeye Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 199 N.W.2d
373, 380 (Iowa 1972); Brooks v. Dietz, 218 Kan. 698, 704-05, 545 P.2d 1104,
111.10 (1976); Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Mo.
1969); Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 567, 209
N.W.2d 643, 655 (1973); Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselischaft,
88 N.M. 355, 358, 540 P.2d 835, 838 (1975); Kirkland v. General Motors
Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974); Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co., 265
Or. 300, 303-04, 509 P.2d 28, 30 (1973); Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co., 423
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gent conduct of the plaintiff in encountering a known risk. The
defense on its face does not cover the entire spectrum of contributory negligence. While it is clear that the negligent conduct
must be based on an assumption of a known risk, it is also clear
that the plaintiff must do more than merely assume an appreciated risk; the risk must be unreasonably assumed. The defense
is then clearly a hybrid of the traditional concepts of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. The defense of assumption of risk in strict products liability exists exclusively in the
overlap of these two defenses. 5 The selection of knowledge,
however, as the key element of assumption of risk in products
liability is still appropriate. The aspect of knowledge has been
the focus of many of the numerous opinions dealing with the
defense of assumption of risk in products liability." Despite the
frequent litigation, the element of knowledge is in need of further clarification.
How much must the plaintiff know before assumption of risk
Pa. 324, 327, 223 A.2d 746, 748 (1966); Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503
S.W.2d 516, 521 (Tenn. 1973); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86
Wash. 2d 145, 155, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (1975).
At least three states hold, however, that the traditional concept of
contributory negligence is a defense to a strict products liability action.
Stephan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 N.H. 248, 249, 266 A.2d 855, 857
(1970) ("failure to discover or foresee dangers which the ordinary person
would have discovered or foreseen as well as negligent conduct after discovery of the danger and in the use of the product will constitute a defense to an action based on strict liability"); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d
330, 342, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 470 (1973) (holding that plaintiff user must prove that in the exercise of reasonable care
he would not have discovered defect and perceived its danger); Dippel
v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460-62, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63-65 (1967) (holding
that defense of contributory negligence is available and is subject to the
state's comparative negligence statute).
The position of Texas is that the traditional concept of assumption
of risk is a defense to strict products liability, and although the plaintiff's
conduct must be voluntary, it does not necessarily mean that reasonableness is always an element of the defense. Henderson v. Ford Motor Co.,
519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974). The Supreme Court of Texas, however, in
almost the same breath made this caveat:
No decision has been made by this Court to rule the case where
the defendant manufacturer should have anticipated that the dangerous design would cause physical harm to one in the course of use
similar to that which caused plaintiff's injury and notwithstanding
the plaintiff user's knowledge of the danger.
Id. at 91.
New Jersey holds that "contributory negligence in its broad sense
is sufficiently comprehensive to encompass all the variant notions expressed . . . as a basis for refusing plaintiff a recovery" and is a defense
to strict products liability. Maiorino v. Weco Prods. Co., 45 N.J. 570, 574,
214 A.2d 18, 20 (1965). However, in its operation, the type of plaintiff
conduct held to bar recovery would be classified as misuse or assumption
of risk. See Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 426-27, 261 N.E.2d
305, 310 (1970); Noel, Products Liability: Bystanders, Contributory
Fault and Unusual Uses, 50 F.R.D. 321, 328-29 (1971). The defense is
not allowed in New Jersey when considerations of policy and justice dictate. Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
5. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 669 (4th ed. 1971).
6. See Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 240 (1972).
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7
can operate to prevent shifting the loss to the manufacturer?
In the traditional defense of assumption of risk, the courts have
required that there be full appreciation of the risk.8 This standard does not provide any useful analytical tool to use in determining the issue, and its flexibility invites litigation. In strict
products liability, the courts have often required that there be
knowledge of the specific defect in the product for the defense
to be applicable.9 This standard also fails to provide any guide
for thoughtful analysis of the issue, and, if taken too literally,
is clearly misleading.
This article will hopefully provide a tool for analyzing the
issue of knowledge, as well as a more meaningful standard as
to what degree of knowledge is required. Initially, the issue can
be analyzed by breaking the risk allegedly assumed into its
factors-the gravity of the harm and the probability of its
occurrence. If the plaintiff does not have a substantial awareness of either one of these factors, he cannot be said to have
knowledge of the risk. Although useful, such analysis leaves the
ultimate question of degree unanswered. In answering this question, it is herein suggested that the appropriate standard to use
is whether the plaintiff possessed such knowledge of the danger
presented by the defective product that would cause a reasonable
man to provide for his own safety by taking precautions commensurate with the danger. This standard is also a flexible one,
but it does provide a helpful guide in determining what degree
of knowledge is necessary for an assumption of risk in a way
that more consistently effectuates the policy considerations
behind strict products liability.

PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

ConsiderationsSupporting Manufacturers'Liability
The doctrine of strict liability in products liability is deeply
rooted in public policy considerations. In the landmark decision
7. Although the defendant in a products liability case may be a re-

tailer, assembler, or anyone else who places the product into the stream
of commerce, 72 C.J.S. Products Liability § 40-43 (Supp. 1975), the term
manufacturer is used in this article to refer to the defendant in a products
liability suit generally.
8. Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA.
L. REV. 122, 141 (1961); Twerski, supra note 2, at 41.
9. McGrath v. Wallace Murray Corp., 496 F.2d 299, 302 (10th Cir.
1974) (specific defect); Hales v. Green Colonial, Inc., 490 F.2d 1015, 1021
(8th Cir. 1974) (specific defect); Sweeney v. Max A.R. Matthews & Co.,
46 Ill. 2d 64, 66, 264 N.E.2d 170, 171 (1970) (dangerous condition); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893, 901 (Pa. 1975) (specific
defect); Haugen v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 15 Wash. App. 379, -,
550 P.2d 71, 75 (1976) (specific defect); see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 402A, comment n (1965).
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of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,' 0 Justice Traynor

stated that the purpose underlying strict products liability "is
to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on
the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.""
There. are a number of reasons which support a policy of
insuring that manufacturers bear the burden of the costs of
injury from their defective products. First and foremost, it is
the manufacturer of the defective product who is primarily
.responsible for the injury occurring. 12 With his greater expertise and technical competency, the manufacturer is in the better
,position to guard against the hazards arising from his products
and to prevent unsafe products from ever reaching the public.' 3
.The exposure to liability, therefore, promotes the public interest
in consumer safety by providing an effective deterrent to the
marketing of dangerous products. 1 4 The manufacturer is also
in a better position to bear the burden of injury financially;
,liability insurance can be obtained and added to the price ,of
the goods. 5 It makes good sense that the inevitable harm
10. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
11. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
12. Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery, 12 Ariz. App. 32, -, 467 P.2d 256,
261 (1970) (Jacobson, J., concurring); Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730,
734, 497 P.2d 732, 736 (1972).
13. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436,
-440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 17 Ill. App. 3d 690, 694, 307 N.E.2d 729, 732 (1974), rev'd on
other grounds, 61 Ill. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975); Cintrone v. Hertz
:Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 446, 212 A.2d 769, 775
(1965); see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 379, 384,
.161 A.2d 69, 81, 83 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c (1965).
14. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262-63, 391 P.2d
168, 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899-900 (1964); Ecola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concur'ring); Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill. 2d 17, 20, 329
N.E.2d 785, 786 (1975); Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill.
2d 339, 344, 247 N.E.2d 401, 404 (1969).
15. Brown v. General Motors Corp., 355 F.2d 814, 821 (4th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1036 (1967); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24
Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 379, 161 A.2d 69, 81
(1960) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c (1965) ;,see
Noel, Products Liability: Bystanders, Contributory Fault and Unusual
Uses, 50 F.R.D. 321, 326-27 (1971); But see Hollinger v. Shoppers Paradise, Inc., 134 N.J. Super. 328, 345, 340 A.2d 687, 696 (1975), where'the
court states that:
Such a rationale is arbitrary in that it fails to account for the specific
characteristics of the product in question and the relationship between the particular consumer and seller from which the action for
strict liability arises. For this reason the 'loss spreading' theory has
been given relatively little weight when compared to other policy
considerations; 'it plays "only the part of a make weight argument"
The imposition of liability on the basis of the "loss spreading" theory
is one of economic policy. Brown v. General Motors Corp., 355 F.2d 814,
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brought about by a system of mass production and complex
marketing channels should be borne by the profits of that system 16 and more specifically by the profits made on the defective
Finally, it is just to impose
product that causes the injury."i
liability upon the manufacturer of a defective product because
of the special responsibility he has assumed toward the public
as a result of the implied promise of safety he makes by putting
his product on the market-a promise the public is forced to rely
s

upon.1

With these considerations in mind it is clear why contributory negligence, which does not rise to the level of an assumption
of risk, is not a defense. 19 To hold that the whole concept of
contributory negligence is a defense to strict products liability
would allow the manufacturer in designing and producing his
products to ignore the possibility of consumer negligence. Product safety, however, requires that the negligent conduct of consumers be anticipated and planned against. Public policy, therefore, demands that the manufacturer take consumer negligence
20
into account.
821 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1036 (1967). As one exposed
to the basic principles of economics well knows, the allocation of resources is most effectively made in a pure competition model where each
good is made to bear all of its costs.
16. Hawkeye Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 199 N.W.2d 373, 382
(Iowa 1972); Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 94, 179 N.W.2d
64, 71 (1970).
17. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 619, 210 N.E.2d 182,
186 (1965) ("the justice of imposing the loss on the one creating the risk
and reaping the profit").
18. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d
897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,
Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 64-65, 207 A.2d 305, 311 (1965); Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 384, 161 A.2d 69, 83 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTs § 402A, comment c (1965), which reads as follows:
c. On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability
has been said to be that the seller, by marketing his product for use
and consumption, has undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who may be injured by it; that the public has the right to and does expect, in the
case of products which it needs and for which it is forced to rely
upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods;
that public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries
caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon those
who market them, and be treated as a cost of production against
which liability insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of
such products is entitled to the maximum protection at the hands
of someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those who market
the products.
19. Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 329 (Alas. 1970) (plaintiff's
negligent conduct concurring with the defect to cause injury is immaterial in light of the initial policies calling for strict liability); Ellithorpe
v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516, 521 (Tenn. 1973) (to hold that ordinary contributory negligence in failing to discover the defect or guard
against the possibility of its occurrence is a defense which would defeat
the purposes for which the theory of strict products liability was created).
20. When a plaintiff's conduct is unforeseeable, the element of proximate cause and the defense of misuse relieve the manufacturer from lia-
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ConsiderationsSupporting the Defense to Liability
The public policy embodied in strict products liability is not
undermined, however, by sanctioning a defense against a plaintiff who is aware of the defective and dangerous condition, yet
freely and unreasonably makes use of the product. In such circumstances it is the plaintiff who is in the better position to see
to it that a safe course of action is taken. 21 The resulting injury
can not be considered as one of the inevitable harms of mass
production which should be considered as part of the cost of the
product, and the obligation of the manufacturer to furnish a safe
product has been extinguished by the consumer's consent to
expose himself to the risk. Furthermore, there is the pervasive
policy in the law of preventing plaintiffs from passively allowing personal losses and a defendant's liability to mount.22
The doctrine of avoidable consequences in tort law and mitigation of damages in contract law are two examples.2 3 These doctrines require the plaintiff to make a reasonable effort to avoid
loss. Similarly, the assumption of risk defense in products liability requires that a plaintiff, who is aware of the risk created
by a defective product, act reasonably in encountering the
danger, if he is to expect the burden of any loss engendered by
the defective product to be shifted to the manufacturer.
The reasoning behind barring plaintiffs from recovery only
where they encounter the risk unreasonably is based on the principle that a plaintiff's right to choice and freedom of action
should not be impaired by a defendant's wrong. The plaintiff,
therefore, should be allowed to protect his choice and freedom
of action even though he reasonably assumes the risks presented
by a defendant's defective product. 24 Where the plaintiff
assumes a risk which is clearly out of proportion with the right
protected, such that a reasonable man would not assume the risk
to protect the right, then the plaintiff is properly barred from
recovery. 25 Thus where the consumer is confronted with a
product he knows to be defective, he will not be barred from
recovery unless he encountered the danger presented by the
bility. 72 C.J.S. Products Liability §§ 30, 31, 47 (Supp. 1975); see Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintiff's Conduct, 1968
UTAH L. REv. 267, 272-73 [hereinafter cited as Epstein].
21. See Hollinger v. Shoppers Paradise, Inc., 134 N.J. Super. 328, 34345, 340 A.2d 687, 695-96 (1975); Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test
for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1062-63 (1972).
22. See Epstein, supra note 20, at 273.
23. RESTATEmENT OF CONTRACTS § 336 (1932); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 918 (1939).
24. See Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22
LA. L. REv. 122, 156-57 (1961); Keeton, Assumption of Products Risks,
19 Sw. L.J. 61, 71-72, 75 (1965); Twerski, supra note 2, at 4-10.
25. Twerski, supra note 2, at 5 n.25.
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Thus, through the defense
defective product unreasonably.26
of assumption of risk the law seeks to impose on consumers part
of the burden of protecting themselves from dangerous products,
while still protecting consumers by recognizing their right to
reasonably assume risks presented by defective products.
Summary of Policy Considerations
The ultimate goal of strict products liability is the protection
of the public from unreasonably dangerous products. The courts
have imposed the primary responsibility for public safety upon
the manufacturers who are in a position to provide safe products
at the outset and are better equipped technically and financially
to bear the responsibility. The defense of assumption of risk is
concerned with how much responsibility should be placed upon
the consumer to provide for his own protection. The burden of
discovering unreasonable danger in a product is placed only upon
the manufacturer. 27 The manufacturer has the superior capability to fulfill this function and the consumer has the right to
rely on his expertise. Therefore, no responsibility is placed upon
the consumer unless he has actual knowledge of the danger
created by a defective product. Such knowledge, however, does
not make the consumer responsible for creating the danger, and
thus he is not absolutely bound to eliminate it; but if he makes
a conscious and intelligent choice to expose himself to the danger,
the law properly requires that the choice be a reasonable one
or that the consumer bear the loss.
PLAINTIFF'S KNOWLEDGE MUST BE SUBJECTIVE
The great weight of authority holds that it is the subjective
knowledge of the plaintiff which is relevant rather than what
a reasonable man would know about the defective product and
the danger it creates.2 8 An obvious corollary to the rule that
26. E.g., Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Pa. 324, 328, 223 A.2d 746,
748-49 (1966). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 473 (1965).
27. The following cases stand for the proposition that plaintiff's negligence in failing to discover the defect is not a defense: Moomey v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 429 F.2d 1184, 1189 (10th Cir. 1970); McDevitt v.
Standard Oil Co., 391 F.2d 364, 369 (5th Cir. 1968); O.S. Stapley Co. v.
Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 561, 447 P.2d 248, 253 (1968); Ruiz v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d 462, 470, 93 Cal. Rptr. 270, 275 (1971).
The following cases stand for the proposition that plaintiff's negligent
conduct in failing to guard against the existence of a defect is not a defense: Shields v. Morton Chem. Co., 95 Idaho 674, 677, 518 P.2d 857, 860
(1974); Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 567, 209
N.W.2d 643, 655 (1973); Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Tiffany, 454 S.W.2d 420, 423
(Tex. Civ. App. 1970). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n supports both of these propositions.
28. See, e.g., Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 815
(9th Cir. 1974); Hastings v. Dis Tran Prods., Inc., 389 F. Supp. 1352, 1357
(W.D. La. 1975); Clarke v. Brockway Motor Trucks, 372 F. Supp. 1342,
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the plaintiff must have actual knowledge of the defect and the
danger it creates is that his knowledge can be neither constructive nor imputed if the defense is to be applicable. 29 A few
courts, however, do hold that a plaintiff may assume risks of
which he should have been aware in the exercise of ordinary
care.3 0 To use an objective reasonable man standard to determine the plaintiff's knowledge is tantamount to recognizing contributory negligence in failing to discover the defect as a

defense.

Without subjective knowledge the plaintiff is unable

to provide for his safety and can hardly be thought to consent
to relieve the defendant from his obligation to provide a safe
product. Thus, to apply an objective standard in determining
the plaintiff's knowledge is totally out of place with the policy
considerations underlying strict products liability. 31
The objective standard places a greater burden on the consumer to
provide for consumer safety and is directly in opposition to the
3 2
Restatement and majority view of the defense.
Yet it is obvious that some objectivity must be allowed in
assessing the plaintiff's subjective knowledge; otherwise, since it
is a fact which is often entirely within the plaintiff's knowledge,
a jury would be forced to rely solely on the plaintiff's own testimony of his knowledge and appreciation of the risk. It is clear,
however, that a juror is not so limited, but may consider other
objective evidence, such as the plaintiff's "age, experience, knowl1347-48 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods,
Inc., 543 P.2d 209, 211 (Alas. 1975); Smith v. Dhy-Dynamic Co., 31 Cal.
App. 3d 852, 857, 107 Cal. Rptr. 907, 909 (1973) Williams v. Brown Mfg.
Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 430, 261 N.E.2d 305, 312 (1970$; Bittner v. Wheel Horse
Prods., Inc., 28 Ill. App. 3d 44, 52, 328 N.E.2d 160, 166 (1975); Berkebile
v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893, 901 (Pa. 1975).
The question is ordinarily one to be determined by the jury. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 430, 261 N.E.2d 305, 312 (1970).
The question, however, need not always go to the jury. Moran v. Raymond Corp., 484 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 932
(1974) (testimony clear that plaintiff knew of the danger); Denton v.
Bachtold Bros., 8 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 291 N.E.2d 229 (1972) (directed verdict for defendant affirmed in light of plaintiff's admitted knowledge);
Fore v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 7 Ill. App. 3d 346, 287 N.E.2d 526 (1972) (summary judgment affirmed based on plaintiff's admissions in deposition).
29. Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 815 (9th Cir.
1974) (stating that any knowledge plaintiff's employer may have had
about the defect is irrelevant unless it was communicated to the plaintiff); Rourke v. Garza, 511 S.W.2d 331, 338 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974), aff'd,
530 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1975); see Lewis v. Stran Steel Corp., 6 Ill. App.
3d 142, 151, 285 N.E.2d 631, 637 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 57 Ill.
2d 94, 311 N.E.2d 128 (1974) (holding that while misuse may be a defense
against liability to a bystander, assumption of the risk by the user-consumer is not a defense to the bystander's action).
30. Shuput v. Heublein Inc., 511 F.2d 1104, 1106 (10th Cir. 1975);
Gangi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 33 Conn. Supp. 81, -, 360 A.2d 907, 909
(Super. Ct. 1976); Fegan v. Lynn Ladder Co., 322 N.E.2d 783, 786 (Mass.
App. 1975); Perkins v. Fit-Well Artificial Limb Co., 30 Utah 2d 151, 153,
514 P.2d 811, 812-13 (1973).
31. See text accompanying notes 10-20 supra.
32. See note 4 supra.
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edge and understanding, as well as, the obviousness of the defect
and the danger it poses." 33 Legal commentators have intimated
that this introduction of objectivity to the subjective standard
leaves the difference between the objective and subjective standard largely theoretical rather than practical,3 4 but this is not
the case. Although a degree of objectivity is introduced to the
inquiry, it is far different from a reasonable man standard which
would merely assess what a reasonable plaintiff should have
known under the circumstances. The jury must still find that
the plaintiff actually did know of the defect, and any circumstantial evidence to that effect must still overcome the plaintiff's
testimony, assuming it is contrary.3 5 It is, therefore, not at all

inconsistent or improbable that a jury may find that-a plaintiff
should have appreciated the danger and yet actually did not
36
appreciate the danger.
If the defective product is certain to cause serious injury,
it may almost conclusively be inferred that the plaintiff was not
aware of the danger, even though the danger would have been
obvious to the most casual observer.3 7 An example of such a
case is Barefield v. La Salle Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,38 where a

plaintiff saw what she thought was ice in a bottle of Coke, gagged
on what she thought was either the ice or tobacco from a
cigarette she was smoking, then continued to drink from the
bottle which actually contained slivers of glass. The very nature
of the defect leads to the all but irrebutable conclusion that she
could not have been aware of it. The jury, however, given a
set of instructions holding her to an objective standard of knowledge, was able to find that she assumed the risk of the injuries
she incurred from ingesting the glass.
33. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 430-31, 261 N.E.2d 305,
312 (1970); Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co., 274 Or. 403, -, 547 P.2d 132,
139 (1976); Kinka v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 36 Ill. App. 3d 752, 759,
344 N.E.2d 655, 661 (1976); see RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 496D,

comment c (1965).
34. Epstein, supra note 20, at 272; Comment, Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Company: Defenses Based on Plaintiff's Conduct in Strict
Liability, 4 J. MAR. J. 95, 104 (1970).
35. See Keeton, Assumption of Products Risks, 19 Sw. L.J. 61, 70-71
(1965); Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and
Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965), where Justice Traynor
stated: "Were a consumer deemed to assume all commonly known risks,
we would come full circle round to the problems generated by the disclaimer of warranty in the implied warranty cases." Id. at 371.
36. See, e.g., Callihan Interests, Inc. v. Halepeska, 349 S.W.2d 758
(Tex. Civ. App. 1961), rev'd 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1963).
37. See Kassouf v. Lee Bros., 209 Cal. App. 2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 276
(1962); Barefield v. La Salle Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 370 Mich. 1, 120
N.W.2d 786 (1963). Although these are breach of warranty cases, they
illustrate the point to be made. Furthermore there is, in the main, little
difference in the applicability and use of assumption of risk in these two
areas. Compare Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 501 (1965) with Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d
240 (1972).
38. 370 Mich. 1, 120 N.W.2d 786 (1963).
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Since the jury may often be given instructions to take into
consideration objective factors in determining whether the plaintiff knew and appreciated the danger,3 9 it is incumbent upon
plaintiff's counsel to make it clear to the jury that the defense
must prove the higher and more difficult subjective standard.
Furthermore, any instruction which intimates that the plaintiff
is to be held to an objective standard with words such as "should
have appreciated the danger" should certainly be objected to.
How MUCH MUST THE

PLAINTIFF KNOW

If the plaintiff actually possesses some knowledge concerning
the danger which he encountered, the question which then
becomes important is whether he possessed sufficient knowledge
for the defense to operate. The traditional requirement has been
40
that the plaintiff must have had full appreciation of the risk.
In strict products liability the courts have frequently required
that he must have had specific knowledge of the defect in the
product for the defense to be applicable. 41 These statements
do not provide a great deal of help in determining the answer
to the question and may even be misleading. The first is too
flexible; the latter is simply arbitrary. Neither is based on the
policy considerations involved in products liability. Thoughtful
analysis must begin with the factors constituting risk and the
underlying policy considerations involved.
Breaking Risk into Its Factors
Risk is the product of two factors, the nature of the possible
harm and the probability of its occurrence. 42 The degree of
any risk is directly proportional to both of these factors. Therefore, a plaintiff who lacks substantial knowledge as to either or
both of these factors cannot be characterized as fully understanding and appreciating the risk.
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.43 illustrates the
point that a plaintiff who is aware of the probability of injury
but not substantially aware of the gravity of the possible harm
cannot be barred from recovery on the basis of assumption of
39. See, e.g., ILLINOIS INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION,

9.20 (1973) (suggested jury instruction), which states "[i]n determining whether the defense of assumption of the risk of injury from use of the (product) has been proved,
you should take into consideration the plaintiff's age, experience, knowledge, and understanding; and the obviousness of such [condition] [or]
[conditions] and the danger involved."
40. See note 8 supra.
41. See note 9 supra.
42. W. PossEm, THE LAW OF TORTS 147 (4th ed. 1971); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D, comment b (1965).
43. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974).
ILLINOIS PRODUCT LIABILITY PRACTICE §

1977]

Knowledge & Assumption of Risk in Products Liability

253

risk. Borel, an insulation worker, instituted an action against
certain manufacturers of insulation materials containing asbestos
to recover for injuries caused by their failure to warn of the
dangers involved in working with asbestos. He contracted the
terminal illness of pulmonary asbestosis from the constant
inhalation of asbestos dust at work, and died before the case came
to trial. Five years before his condition was diagnosed, Borel's
doctor advised him to avoid the dust as much as possible. In
his pre-trial deposition, Borel testified that for years he had
known that inhaling the dust was bad for him. Borel also testified, however, that he never was aware that serious or terminal
illness could result. The trial court gave instructions on strict
liability and assumption of risk, and the jury returned a verdict
for the plaintiff.
On appeal the defendants argued that they were entitled to
44
a verdict on the basis of assumption of risk as a matter of law.
In upholding the jury's verdict the court of appeals referred to
Borel's testimony that he never realized the dust could cause
serious illness 4 I and indicated that a jury could find "that Borel
never actually knew or appreciated the extent of the danger
involved" despite the fact that the danger could be considered
fairly obvious. 46
Thus, although a plaintiff may clearly be
aware of the probability of harm, he cannot be found to have
assumed the risk unless he also knew the gravity of the possible
47
harm.
Just as lack of knowledge of the gravity of harm prevents
one from fully knowing and appreciating the risk, ignorance of
the greater probability that the harm will actually occur also
prevents one from fully appreciating the risk. This concept
explains why it is said that knowledge of the specific defect is
required before there can be an assumption of risk in products
44. Id. at 1081-83.
45. 'A. Yes, I knew the dust was bad but we used to talk [about]
it among the insulators, [about] how bad was this dust, could it give
you TB, could it give you this, and everyone was saying no, that dust
don't hurt you, it dissolves as it hits your lungs. That was the question you get all the time.
Q. Where would you have this discussion, in your Union Hall?
A. On the jobs, just among the men.
Q. In other words, there was some question in your mind as to
whether this was dangerous and whether it was bad for your health?
A. There was always a question, you just never know how dangerous it was. I never did know really. If I had known I would have
gotten out of it.
Q. All right, then you did know it had some degree of danger but
you didn't know how dangerous it was?
A. I knew I was working with insulation.
Q. Did you know that it contained asbestos?
A. Yes, sir, but I didn't know what asbestos was.'
Id. at 1082.
46. Id. at 1098,
47. Id.
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liability cases 48 and why contributory negligence in encountering a known danger which is of the same nature as that created
by the defect of which the plaintiff has no knowledge is not a
defense. 49 There have been many cases in which a plaintiff,
without knowledge of any defect in the product, has freely and
unreasonably confronted situations of known danger, and the
defective product has proximately caused an injury of the very
same nature as that threatened by the danger to which the plaintiff freely exposed himself. The following examples are illustrative. A crane operator stands below an object improperly suspended from a crane, and the object falls on him due to a
mechanical defect in the crane. 0 A laborer works dangerously
close to a bulldozer, and the machine topples over on him because
of its defective brakes; 51 or the driver runs over him because
of a design defect which limits the driver's rear view. 52 A
boater, sitting in a precarious position on the dash of a speed
boat is thrown into the water and caught in the propeller when
a defective steering mechanism causes the boat to suddenly
swerve.5 3 A reckless automobile driver who is involved in an
accident is immediately engulfed in flames because of an improperly constructed gas tank.5 4 In all these cases, the plaintiff was
unaware of the defect in the product and, therefore, was ignorant
of the greater probability that the possible harm, which he
admittedly chose to chance, would actually occur.
Merely because a plaintiff enters into a known zone of
danger does not mean that he has assumed the risk of the injury
from any possible source, including unknown product defects.
The relevant inquiry is whether he assumed the risk of injury
presented by the unreasonably dangerous defective product. 55
Risk takers are not wrongdoers. The policy considerations
underlying strict products liability do not dictate that risk
takers be barred from recovering for injuries proximately
caused by defective products, even though their negligent risk
48. See Hales v. Green Colonial, Inc., 490 F.2d 1015, 1021 (8th Cir.
1974); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893 (Pa. 1975).
See notes 50-56 and accompanying text infra.
49. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209,
212 (Alas. 1975); Noel, Products Liability: Bystanders, Contributory
Fault and Unusual Uses, 50 F.R.D. 321, 327-28 (1971). See notes 50-56
and accompanying text infra.
50. Reese v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 55 Ill. 2d 356, 303 N.E.2d 382
(1973).
51. Smith v. Dhy-Dynamic Co., 31 Cal. App. 3d 852, 107 Cal. Rptr.
907 (1973).
52. Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 629 (1970).
53. O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968).
54. DeFelice v. Ford Motor Co., 28 Conn. Supp. 164, 255 A.2d 636 (Super. Ct. 1969).
55. Smith v. Dhy-Dynamic Co., 31 Cal. App. 3d 852, 860, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 907, 912 (1973).
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taking concurrently caused their injury. Without knowledge of
the unreasonably dangerous defect, a risk taker has as much right
to rely on the implied representation of safety as does the most
cautious person; indeed, he is much more in need of a safe product.50 The conduct of such consumers can be characterized as
putting the product to the test. The manufacturer has the duty
to anticipate that his products will not always be used in risk
free circumstances; consequently, he is under a duty to design,
manufacture, and promote his product in such a way that it
57
will not be unreasonably dangerous in its foreseeable uses.
A unique situation is presented by a defective product which
poses two different types of danger.58 The total risk presented
by a defective product which presents a risk of two different
types of harm is equal to the gravity of harm A multiplied by
the probability of A's occurrence plus the gravity of harm B
multiplied by the probability of B's occurrence.5 9 When the consumer is aware of only one possible injury from a defective product, it cannot be said that he assumed the risk of the other. 0
For example, although a plaintiff is aware of the toxicity of an
epoxy spray paint and is clearly warned that adequate ventilation is required, he cannot be said to have assumed the risk of
injury from an explosion caused by the fact that he did not
adequately ventilate the work space."1 Let us assume, however,
that the plaintiff was actually injured from the inhalation of
the toxic fumes.6 2 Would assumption of risk be inapplicable
because the plaintiff did not have full knowledge and appreciation of the danger? It would appear that he should be barred
from recovery because he was fully aware and appreciated the
risk of the spray's toxicity which causes his injury.6 3 Whether
the plaintiff is harmed by the danger of which he was aware
56. Cf. Robinson v. Pioche, Bayerque & Co., 5 Cal. 461, 462 (1885),
where the court stated that, "[a] drunken man is as much entitled to a
safe street, as a sober one, and much more in need of it."
57. See Noel, Products Liability: Bystanders, Contributory Fault and
Unusual Uses, 50 F.R.D. 321, 322 (1971).
58. Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 810-11 (9th
Cir. 1974).
59. The total risk presented may be mathematically depicted as follows:
the gravity of harm A X the probability of A's occurrence
+the gravity of harm B x the probability of B's occurrence
=the total risk presented
60. Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 810-11 (9th
Cir. 1974); Haugen v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 15 Wash. App. 379,
-,550 P.2d 71, 75 (1976).
61. Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 811-15 (9th
Cir. 1974).
62. In Jackson the plaintiff actually did take adequate precautions
against this danger through the use of a breathing hose. Id. at 811.
63. Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA.
L. REv. 122, 126 (1961); see Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 921-22
(Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
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or by the danger of which he was not aware, his knowledge of
the risk should be analyzed on the premise that risk is separable
64
and not unitary.
The Question of Degree
The question still remains, however, as to how close the
plaintiff's knowledge of the risk must be to the actual realities
of the risk situation created by a defective product. Does full
appreciation of the risk mean that the plaintiff's perception of
the risk must be perfectly congruent with reality? Must the
plaintiff have calculated the risk with the certitude that one can
calculate the probability of rolling snake eyes with a pair of
dice? 5 To say that the risk is not fully appreciated when the
plaintiff lacks substantial knowledge of either the probability or
the gravity of the harm does lead to some fruitful analysis. The
problem lies in the word "substantial"; it does not provide any
useful guide in determining the question of degree.
Previous Arguments
Professor Robert Keeton noted that the concept of risk in
itself indicated that there was some want of appreciation of the
forces involved, otherwise one would know whether or not an
injury would occur. He explained that since the concept of risk
is one of man's abstract constructions, which can only be defined
from some human point of view, it is necessarily based on incomplete understanding. He argued that full appreciation of the
risk, therefore, can only have meaning in relative terms by holding out some point of view chosen as the standard. 6 Keeton
then suggested that where the basis of the defendant's liability
is negligence, full appreciation should mean, subject to some
exceptions,67 that the plaintiff understood the risk as well as
the defendant should have understood it. This would mean that
the plaintiff would have to know what a reasonable man in
the position of the defendant would have known.0 8 Whatever
the validity of Keeton's analysis, the standard he suggests clearly
has no value in strict products liability, since there is nothing
that the manufacturer should necessarily have known for liability to result.69 Liability is placed on the manufacturer merely
64. Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA.
L. REv. 122, 125-26 (1961).

65. See note 59 supra.
66. Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA.

L. REv. 122, 124-25 (1961).
67. Id. at 125 n.7.

68. Id. at 125.
69. 72 C.J.S. Products Liability § 7 (Supp. 1975).
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of public policy, primarily responsible
because he is, as a matter
70
for consumer safety.
Professor Mansfield proposed a sharply different stand71
ard.
Although he agreed that the very concept of risk
imported some lack of knowledge and could only be defined in
relation to some particular point of view, he did not agree with
72
Keeton's selection of the view of the reasonable defendant.
He reasoned that the concept of risk as it relates to the defendant's conduct is designed to achieve the purpose of deterring the
defendant from engaging in risk creating conduct. He contended
that assumption of risk, however, is not concerned with deterring
any particular conduct of the plaintiff, but rather with determining whether the plaintiff's conduct is such that it is just to deny
him relief. 73 He proposed, therefore, that the plaintiff's knowledge is sufficient to make the defense operable if it provides "a
sound basis, as is usually available in such circumstances, for
deciding whether it is to the plaintiff's interest that [the harm
actually occur].

'74

A more recent author, agreeing with Mans-

field's approach and applying it to strict products liability cases,
satisfied, if
has argued that the knowledge criterion would be
75
the plaintiff knows an important matter is at stake.
The problem with applying Mansfield's proposed standard
in the area of strict products liability is that the defense of
assumption of risk in this area is concerned with deterring
certain consumer conduct. Unlike the traditional concept of
assumption of risk, the related defense in strict products liability
only bars recovery if the plantiff, after having knowledge of the
defect, acts unreasonably in using the product.76 Assumption
of risk in strict products liability, therefore, is concerned with
deterring unreasonable consumer conduct after discovery of the
unreasonable danger presented by a defective product. The
point of view for defining the knowledge criterion should be
intimately related to the concern for deterring such unreasonable
consumer conduct and the policy underlying strict products
liability. Since the ultimate goal of strict products liability is
to provide for consumer safety, it is submitted that the plaintiff's
knowledge is sufficient to make the defense operable, if it would
cause a reasonable man to provide for his own safety by taking
precautions commensurate with the risk. Such a standard would
70. See text accompanying notes 10-20 supra.
71. Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 22 LA. L. REV.

17 (1961).
72. Id. at 37.
73. Id. at 38 n.29a.
74. Id. at 38.
75. Twerski, supra note 2, at 43.
76. See notes 1-5 and accompanying text and text accompanying
notes 21-26 supra.
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further the policy considerations of products liability by requiring the plaintiff to act reasonably or be barred from recovery,
only when the plaintiff is in possession of such knowledge that,
if he had acted reasonably, he would have been safe from the
danger presented by the defective product.
The Suggested Test
In D'Arienzo v. Clairol, Inc. 77 the court impliedly adopted
such a test. D'Arienzo used a Clairol hair coloring product which
caused injuries to her hair, scalp, and face by an allergic
reaction which she developed only after repeated use of the
product. Although she had previously conducted a patch test
as set forth in the directions before using the product on an
earlier occasion, she did not do so before the application which
caused her injuries. Clairol grounded its defense on the fact
that if she had performed the patch test, which, as the instructions made clear, was to be conducted 24 hours before each application, the test would have revealed that the use of the product
was contraindicated. Clairol moved for summary judgment; the
78
motion was denied.
Clairol's defense raised issues as to whether Clairol fully performed its duty to warn the consumers of its product, and
whether D'Arienzo assumed the risk of her injuries. The court
perspicaciously noted that these two issues were inextricably
intertwined. The first issue poses the question of whether the
defendant gave the plaintiff a full warning of the danger
involved in the use of a product, while the second asks whether
the plaintiff was actually fully aware of the danger involved. 79
If the manufacturer was to fulfill his duty to provide adequate
consumer protection by imposing a measure of control on the
inherently dangerous product through the use of a warning, the
D'Arienzo court explained that it was not sufficient to merely
give clear instructions on the product's safe use: "'Implicit in
the duty to warn is the duty to warn with a degree of intensity
that would cause a reasonable man to exercise for his own safety
the caution commensurate with the potential danger.'"so Thus,
an adequate warning is one which provides sufficient information
77. 125 N.J. Super. 224, 310 A.2d 106 (Super. Ct. 1973).
78. Id. at 226-27, 310 A.2d at 107-08.
79. Id. at 227, 310 A.2d at 108. The only difference between the two
issues is the standard applied. The adequacy of the warning is determined on an objective expected user standard, while the sufficiency of
the knowledge for assumption of risk is based on a subjective standard.
See Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974);
72 C.J.S. Products Liability §§ 28, 46 (Supp. 1975) (comparison of these
two sections bears out the above proposition).
80. 125 N.J. Super. at 231, 310 A.2d at 110 (citing Tampa Drug Co.
v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603, 609, 75 A.L.R.2d 765 (Fla. 1958)).

1977]

Knowledge & Assumption of Risk in Products Liability

259

to the consumer to put him in a position to control the risk situation created by the inherently dangerous product such that a
reasonable man would adequately provide for his own safety.
The court stated that such a warning would necessarily have
informed the consumer of both of the factors constituting the
risk.8 1
The court found it questionable whether either the gravity
of the harm or the probability of its occurrence was adequately
conveyed by the warning.8 2 The warning did not state in detail
the possible adverse reactions to the product 8s and the extent
of the danger could have been clarified if the directions had
explained that allergies can be acquired and that positive results
with previous use is no indication that the user will not have
an allergic reaction. Under these circumstances the court held
that it could not find the plaintiff assumed the risk as a matter
of law, but specifically left open the availability of the defense
84
at trial.
D'Arienzo exemplifies the more sound method of analysis in
assessing a plaintiff's knowledge by focusing on the factors that
compose risk, and by impliedly requiring that the plaintiff possess
such knowledge that would induce a reasonable man to take adequate precautions to protect himself from the actual danger.8 5
Keeping in mind the policy considerations underlying strict products liability, this would be the proper point for the law to shift
part of the burden of consumer safety upon the consumer himself, by requiring that the consumer act reasonably when in
possession of such knowledge. This is a much more meaningful
81. 125 N.J. Super. at 231, 310 A.2d at 110.
82. Id. at 233-36, 310 A.2d at 111-13.

83. The instructions for the use of the product involved herein were

both directive and explanatory. Undeniably, they stated that the
patch test must be performed before each application. This was
their directive linguistic function. Additionally, however, they explained the reason for this test. They indicated that 'certain individuals' may be allergic or hypersensitive to the product, though it
was 'harmless to the multitude.' Twice thereafter sensitive individuals were referred to under the rubric of 'relatively few persons.'
This explains the requirement of the patch test and is inseparable
from the directive passages.
We note the fact that, save for the use of the terms 'allergic,'
'hypersensitive' and 'unfavorable effect or result,' no additional
warning is given of any possible adverse consequences resulting
from the use of the product. It is only in the course of the instructions for the performance of the patch test itself that the consumer
is told, '. . . if any reddening of the skin, burning, itching, swelling,
irritation, eruption or any other abnormal reaction is experienced in
or around the test area, then the person is predisposed to the preparation and must not use it.' Clearly, if the consumer was unconvinced of the necessity for the test, he might well not continue reading into the instructions themselves.
Id. at 233, 310 A.2d at 111.
84. Id. at 236-37, 310 A.2d at 113.
85. See id. at 231, 310 A.2d at 110.
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and useful statement than the "full appreciation of the risk" or
the "specific defect" formulae. 8
Full Appreciation
Typically, the probability factor of a risk in a products case
is not capable of precise ascertainment. Using a defective product is not like playing Russian roulette or rolling dice, where
the probabilities can be mathematically ascertained.
If full knowledge and appreciation of the risk were taken
too literally, assumption of risk would rarely be applicable. For
example, in Moran v. Raymond Corp. 7 the plaintiff made such
a contention and the court properly rejected it. Moran was
operating a forklift truck from outside the driver's cage against
orders to the contrary. Moran knew that if he did not quickly
withdraw his hand from the driver's cage after activating the
forklift, a bar would hit him. The bar was only a foot and a
half from Moran's head when he pulled the lever inside the cage.
Moran's hand got caught inside the cage, and the bar came down
on his arm causing serious injuries 8 Moran argued that he was
unaware that the bar would come down as quickly as it did,
because his previous experience with these trucks was that the
forklift moved at a slower rate.8 9 This would indicate that he
did not know the true probability of not getting his arm out
in time. The court was not moved by the argument and made
a visceral statement to the effect that the plaintiff knew enough
to assume the risk holding that, "one who stands under the
guillotine blade with knowledge of the fact that there will
be a descent of the operational part upon activation of the controlling lever would scarcely seem to be in a position to claim
that the blade fell faster than he anticipated." 90 Although
the court's analogy is convincing, a better reasoned explanation
could be made using the test suggested by the D'Arienzo
opinion. 9 1 Reasonable men with Moran's knowledge and appreciation of the danger posed by the forklift would have exercised
caution commensurate with the risk so that it would have been
operated in a safe manner.
Specific Defect
Another statement frequently made is that the plaintiff must
be aware of the specific defect in order to invoke assumption
86. See notes 8 and 9 supra.
87. 484 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 932 (1974).
88. Id. at 1009, 1015-16.

89. Id. at 1016.
90. Id.
91. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
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of risk. 2 This statement is misleading, literally incorrect, and
of little analytical value. In an age of technically complex products the actual mechanical or design defect may not be apparent
to the consumer, although the dangerous condition created by
it may be readily apparent.13 If knowledge of the specific defect
were literally required by the law, assumption of risk frequently
would not be applicable where the plaintiff should justly be
barred from recovery.
Cornette v. Searjant Metal Products, Inc.9 4 offers a good
example on this point. Esta Cornette was a punch press operator
whose work required her to reach into the press to remove metal
"blanks" while the press "ram" was in the "up" position. While
she had her hand in the press, the press "double-tripped" and
cut off three of her fingers. Some evidence was introduced at
trial to the effect that the machine "double-tripped" because of
the absence of an air filter in the machine's control system.
There was nothing to indicate that this possible defect was
known to the plaintiff, but she did know that the press had
"double-tripped" before. 95 The court held that assumption of
risk was applicable so long as the risk was known and understood.9 6 Once again the test suggested by D'Arienzo would provide a well reasoned answer to this case.9 7 Reasonable men with
knowledge of the machine's previous "double-tripping" would
have taken precautions commensurate with the risk. The machine would not be dangerous to a reasonable man because he
could have provided for his own safety.
CONCLUSION
Strict products liability places the primary responsibility for
consumer safety on the manufacturer. The defense of assumption of risk shifts part of that responsibility upon the consumer
by requiring him to act reasonably in the face of known product
dangers. The knowledge criterion of the assumption of risk
defense determines when the law imposes part of the responsibility of consumer safety on the consumer himself. If the consumer is to bear that responsibility it is clear that his knowledge
92. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
93. See, e.g., Gutelius v. General Elec. Co., 37 Cal. App. 2d 455, 99
P.2d 682 (1940) (plaintiff knew that washing machine wringer, in which
she caught her hair and was unable to stop, was difficult to shift into
neutral, but had no knowledge of the "burr" in the clutch mechanism
responsible for the difficult shifting); Cornette v. Searjeant Metal Prods.,
Inc., 147 Ind. App. 46, 258 N.E.2d 652 (1970) (plaintiff knew punch press
would sometimes "double-trip," but did not know that air filter was
missing which caused the machine to "double-trip").
94. 147 Ind. App. 46, 258 N.E.2d 652 (1970).
95. Id. at 48, 258 N.E.2d at 653-54.
96. Id. at 54, 258 N.E.2d at 657.
97. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
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of the danger presented by the defective product must be subjective, not constructive or imputed. The law does not require the
consumer to anticipate and guard against the possibility of dangerous product defects; that responsibility is placed entirely upon
the manufacturer.
Once it becomes clear that the consumer does know something about the danger presented by a defective product, it is
necessary to determine whether he knows enough so that the
law should properly require him to act reasonably or be barred
from any recovery. The question can be initially analyzed by
breaking the risk into its factors-the gravity of the possible
harm and the possibility of its occurrence. If the consumer is
substantially lacking knowledge of either one of these factors,
the knowledge criterion of the assumption of risk defense has
not been met. The question, however, is essentially one of
degree, and in the close case there is little guidance offered by
a standard requiring substantial knowledge of both of the factors
constituting risk. The same is true of a standard requiring full
appreciation of the risk or knowledge of the specific defect.
To solve this problem of degree it is suggested that the
knowledge criterion should require that the consumer have
sufficient knowledge to cause a reasonable man to provide for
his own safety by taking precautions commensurate with the
risk. Since the ultimate goal of products liability is consumer
safety, it makes sense that the knowledge criterion should be
formulated in such a manner so that the consumer will not be
barred from recovery by the assumption of risk defense, unless
he could be expected to have provided for his own safety. This
supports developing a standard for the knowledge element which
is intimately related to the element of unreasonable use in the
assumption of risk defense.
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